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IMMUNITY DOESN’T FLY: THE CASE FOR FEDERAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR TORTS COMMITTED BY
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OFFICERS
COURTNEY RIMANN*

ABSTRACT
Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) are the Transportation Security Administration’s first line of defense against terrorism in U.S. airways. The American flying public puts their safety,
and their luggage, in the hands of these officers, who execute
searches that range from metal detectors to physical pat-downs.
Since the federal government has mandated searches and
screening for airport security, passengers should be able to seek
recovery from the federal government where a TSO commits
certain intentional torts in the course of duty. Currently, only
the Courts of Appeals for the Third Circuit and Eighth Circuit
have cleared the runway for such recovery by finding TSOs are
“investigative or law enforcement officers” under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waiver found in the law enforcement
proviso (Proviso).
This Comment will discuss how the courts have interpreted
the interplay between the FTCA and the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) as to federal liability, leading to a
circuit split. This Comment will propose two paths to provide
clear recovery for injured passengers. First, Congress should
amend the ATSA to designate TSOs as investigative or law enforcement officers. Next, absent legislative action, the U.S. Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split by finding TSOs to
be investigative or law enforcement officers based on the ordinary plain meaning of the definition provided in the Proviso.
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2022. B.S., Geography,
University of Southern Mississippi, 2017. I would like to thank my husband, J.D.,
for his constant love and encouragement on our adventure to becoming lawyers.
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INTRODUCTION

M

OST AMERICANS ARE familiar with the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) security checkpoint where
passengers enter an airport terminal: hard, gray bins; clear,
quart-sized bag; three-ounce bottles; shoes off; pockets empty;
laptops out.1 For most, it is the last hurdle before boarding an
airplane for a vacation, a family trip, or business. But for some, it
can be the start of a lengthy litigation battle seeking recovery for
1 See Security Screening, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening [https://perma.cc/TF76-3T6K] (click “Carry-on Baggage
Screening”).
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injuries caused by TSA agents running the checkpoint.2 Currently, the United States Courts of Appeals are divided over
whether injured passengers can recover from the federal government for acts or omissions of Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) employed by the TSA, a federal agency.3 Congress
should amend the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(ATSA) to define TSOs as “law enforcement officers” for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Even absent legislative change, the Supreme Court should resolve the current
circuit split and build upon recent interpretive precedent to
find that TSA screeners fall within the scope of the law enforcement proviso (Proviso) based on the plain meaning of the
Proviso.
Congress federalized U.S. aviation security through the ATSA,
which created the TSA and instituted mandatory screening of
every passenger and bag.4 The FTCA waives sovereign immunity
for enumerated torts, allowing for suits against the federal government for actions of government agents.5 This Comment will
discuss the history of both the FTCA and the ATSA, then, turning to the current intersection of these two statutes, address the
current state of the law regarding federal tort liability for TSOs’
actions. Finally, this Comment will consider why passengers
need recourse for injuries inflicted during airport screening and
propose ways to achieve this recourse through legislative action
and judicial precedent.
II.

PREPARING FOR TAKEOFF: STATUTORY HISTORY OF
THE FTCA AND ATSA

As the federal government has expanded its control of aviation security, it has opened the door to liability. Though the
text’s plain meaning ultimately governs the issue of federal liability for a TSO’s actions, understanding the controlling statutes
of tort liability and federal aviation security lays out the runway.
2 See Daniel S. Harawa, The Post-TSA Airport: A Constitution Free Zone?, 41 PEPP. L.
REV. 1, 4 (2013).
3 See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
4 See 49 U.S.C. § 114 (statute forming the Transportation Security Administration); id. § 44902 (requiring all air carriers to “refuse to transport” passengers
and property where a passenger does not “consent to a search” of the passenger
or property).
5 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (“The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual . . . .”).
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SOVEREIGN

Sovereign immunity is generally attributed to the historical
idea, “the King can do no wrong.”6 Traditionally, some recovery
was provided by making the Crown’s agents individually liable to
injured parties.7 The idea of individual liability as a means to
shield the sovereign made its way into the U.S. legal system.8
Before the Civil War, Congress adopted private bills providing
recovery from the federal government for the victim while protecting government agents from “ruinous liability.”9 A private
bill for each injury quickly proved to be time-intensive and burdensome.10 So, in 1946, Congress passed the FTCA, which
waived the government’s sovereign immunity in limited and
codified situations.11
The FTCA provides that the United States will be held liable
for certain tortious acts that are committed by federal employees “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances.”12 Under the FTCA, federal
district courts have “exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on
claims against the United States, for money damages . . . for
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death” resulting
from certain acts or omissions of a government employee.13 A
judgment under the FTCA indemnifies the federal employee
from further claims for the same injury.14
6 Eric Wang, Note, Tortious Constructions: Holding Federal Law Enforcement Accountable by Applying the FTCA’s Law Enforcement Proviso over the Discretionary Function Exception, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1943, 1961 (2020).
7 Id. at 1962.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 1963 (citing James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and
Private Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1871–76 (2010)). These private bills did not set aside or
waive the federal government’s sovereign immunity but did grant recovery.
“Functionally, the government assumed liability while maintaining technical immunity.” Id.
10 Id.
11 See, e.g., id.
12 28 U.S.C. § 2674. This liability does not extend to “interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.” Id.
13 Id. § 1346(b)(1).
14 Id. § 2676 (“The judgment in an action under . . . this title shall constitute a
complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter,
against the employee of the government . . . .”).
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However, a claim brought under the FTCA must meet several
threshold requirements for a federal court to find jurisdiction.15
First, the law only applies to torts “caused by [a] negligent or
wrongful act or omission” committed by an employee within the
scope of government employment.16 The law does not waive sovereign immunity where a tort is committed by a federal contractor17 or by a federal employee acting outside the scope of
employment.18 Courts determine the scope of employment by
looking to the state law where the tort occurred.19 Second, a
plaintiff can only bring an action if they first file a claim with the
relevant agency and their claim is “denied by the agency in writing.”20 Finally, the claim cannot fall within any of the thirteen
exceptions provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 2680.21
Of particular note to this Comment is the “intentional torts
exception,” which bars “[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.”22 Thus, sovereign immunity is
not waived where a federal employee’s actions constitute one of
eleven enumerated intentional torts.23 However, Congress provided for a “carve-out” within the intentional torts exception
through the law enforcement proviso (Proviso).24 The intenSee id. § 1346(b)(1).
Id. The tortious act or omission must be within the government employee’s
scope of employment and must be for an act or omission that a private citizen
could be held liable for. Id.
17 Id. § 2671 (“[T]he term ‘Federal agency’ . . . does not include any contractor with the United States. ‘Employee of the government’ includes (1) officers or
employees of any federal agency . . . and persons acting on behalf of a federal
agency in an official capacity . . . .”).
18 See id. § 1346(b)(1).
19 KEVIN M. LEWIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45732, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
(FTCA): A LEGAL OVERVIEW 12 (2019). “[M]any states consider whether the employer hired the employee to perform the act in question and whether the employee undertook the allegedly tortious activity to promote the employer’s
interests. The mere fact that the employee committed an illegal or wrongful act
does not necessarily entail that the employee acted outside the scope of his employment.” Id. Where the alleged tort is found to fall outside the scope of employment, the plaintiff will not have a claim for recovery under the FTCA but may
have a claim under state law. Id. at 11.
20 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The FTCA requires a final agency action in order for a
federal district court to assert jurisdiction. Id.
21 Id. § 2680.
22 Id. § 2680(h).
23 See id.
24 See LEWIS, supra note 19, at 26.
15
16
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tional torts exception does not apply to tortious conduct where
the claim arises from “assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution” committed by
investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States
Government.25 The FTCA provides that “[f]or the purpose of
this subsection, ‘investigative or law enforcement officer’ means
any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations
of Federal law.”26 Sovereign immunity is waived for claims committed by any federal “investigative or law enforcement officer”
as defined by the Proviso, and, thus, federal district courts retain
subject matter jurisdiction to hear such claims.27
The Proviso was included in the 1974 Amendments to the
FTCA after federal law enforcement officials executed several
federal “no-knock warrants” at the wrong addresses.28 In widely
publicized incidents, federal narcotics agents executed noknock warrants.29 Both homes that the federal agents invaded
turned out to be the wrong location, only after the agents intimidated and threatened the residents and ransacked the homes.30
Congress enacted the Proviso to provide a recovery method for
injuries suffered at the hands of federal agents improperly carrying out mandated duties.31 Congress understood that including
the Proviso within the intentional torts exception would carve
out a claim for those intentional torts that are not easily exaggerated by the plaintiff.32
Two conditions must be met in order to find a waiver of sovereign immunity.33 First, there must be a clear statement in a statute to find sovereign immunity was waived.34 Second, the courts
have traditionally construed any ambiguity “strictly in favor of
the sovereign.”35 However, the Supreme Court has begun to re28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
Id.
27 See id.
28 Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam);
Gregory C. Sisk, Twilight for the Strict Construction of Waivers of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1245, 1305 (2014).
29 Wang, supra note 6, at 1954.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 1954–55.
32 Id. at 1955 (“[L]aw enforcement abuses are not too easily exaggerated and
should be squarely within the ambit of the FTCA”).
33 See Sisk, supra note 28, at 1249.
34 Id. at 1249–50 (“[T]he federal government’s consent to suit must be expressed through unequivocal statutory text.”).
35 Id. at 1249.
25
26
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ject strict construction in favor of the government where the
Court does not find ambiguity within the relevant statutory
text.36 The Court has instead looked to traditional tools of construction, especially where the Court is tasked with interpreting
an exception to a waiver, as in the FTCA.37
The Court expounded the proper interpretation for exceptions to sovereign immunity waivers in Dolan v. U.S. Postal Service.38 In Dolan, a customer who was injured by tripping over
negligently placed mail sued under the FTCA.39 The question
before the Court was whether the “postal exception” applied to
a claim for negligently placed mail and thus if sovereign immunity was retained.40 The Court held the exception did not apply,
finding that the exception must be read narrowly to preserve
the broad waiver of sovereign immunity granted in the statute.41
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, relied both on the
plain meaning of the relevant text and the context of the statute
as a whole, stating:
The definition of words in isolation, however, is not necessarily
controlling in statutory construction. A word in a statute may or
may not extend to the outer limits of its definitional possibilities.
Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the
whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the
statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform
the analysis. Here, we conclude both context and precedent require a narrower reading.42

Specifically, the Court pointed to the surrounding exceptions to
the FTCA waiver, noting that “[o]ther . . . exceptions paint with
a far broader brush,” for support of the conclusion that the postal exception must be read narrowly, since the choice of words
in the exception “expressed [Congress’s] intent to immunize
only a subset of postal wrongdoing, not all torts committed in
the course of mail delivery.”43 Dolan stands for the rule that the
scope of exceptions are not necessarily construed in favor of the
See id. at 1253.
See id. at 1269–70 (discussing the Court’s holding in Dolan v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 546 U.S. 481 (2006)).
38 546 U.S. 481.
39 Id. at 483.
40 Id. at 485.
41 Id. at 486.
42 Id. Justice Thomas was the lone dissenter, finding that the statute was ambiguous and should, therefore, be construed in favor of the sovereign. Id. at 492–93
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
43 Id. at 489–90 (majority opinion).
36
37
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sovereign but are first analyzed for plain meaning and context.44
The Court noted that its holding “does not implicate the general rule [of strict construction] in favor of the sovereign. . . .
[T]his principle is unhelpful in the FTCA context, where ‘unduly generous interpretations of the exceptions run the risk of
defeating the central purpose of the statute’ . . . .”45
Where the Court in Dolan established rules for interpreting
exceptions to statutory waivers, the Court in Millbrook v. United
States considered the scope of the Proviso as to intentional
torts.46 In Millbrook, the petitioner brought suit under the Proviso, “asserting claims of negligence, assault, and battery” committed by correctional officers employed by the Federal Bureau
of Prisons.47 The question before the Court was whether the
Proviso only waived sovereign immunity for “tortious conduct
[that occurred] in the course of executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest.”48 The Court found the waiver was
not so limited.49 Justice Thomas, the lone dissenter in Dolan,
wrote for a unanimous Court.50 The Court described the Proviso
structure and requirements as such:
[T]he law enforcement proviso applies where a claim both arises
out of one of the proviso’s six intentional torts, and is related to
the “acts or omissions” of an “investigative or law enforcement
officer.” The proviso[ ] . . . incorporates an additional requirement that the acts or omissions giving rise to the claim occur
while the officer is “acting within the scope of his office or
employment.”51

Multiple lower courts had further limited the Proviso by only
allowing a waiver where the tortious conduct arose from
“searches, seizures of evidence, arrests, and closely related exercises of investigative or law-enforcement authority.”52 The Court
rejected this interpretation, holding that the statutory language
was not ambiguous, and “Congress ha[d] spoken directly to the
circumstances in which a law enforcement officer’s conduct may
expose the United States to tort liability.”53 Ultimately, the
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Id. at 489, 491–92.
Id. at 491–92 (citation omitted).
Millbrook v. United States, 569 U.S. 50, 52–53 (2013).
Id. at 51, 53.
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 54–55.
Id. at 55–56 (quoting court-appointed amicus curiae).
Id. at 56–57.
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Court held the Proviso to “focus[ ] on the status of persons
whose conduct may be actionable,” and that “[t]he plain text
confirm[ed] that Congress intended immunity determinations
to depend on a federal officer’s legal authority.”54
Millbrook demonstrates the Court’s reliance on the plain
meaning of the Proviso when interpreting its scope. This interpretive precedent will help determine the scope of the Proviso
as to who is included as an “investigative or law enforcement officer” for purposes of tort liability under the FTCA and why extra-textual considerations are unhelpful.55
B.

THE AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT:
AIRPORT SECURITY AND GOVERNMENT CONTROL

For anyone who has flown in this century, the TSA is a familiar name. But the federal role in airport security did not begin
with the TSA.56 Increased screening with broad discretion has
also unfortunately led to an increase in a misuse of power by
some TSOs.57
1.

The Path to Federalizing Aviation Security

Aviation security first garnered national attention and congressional response in the 1960s, in response to the first act of
piracy, or hijacking, that was committed in U.S. airways.58 Even
after aircraft piracy was labeled a federal offense, the number of
aircraft hijackings trended upward, with forty attempted in
1969.59 In response, President Richard Nixon took a strong
stance to combat the concerning increase, introducing a new
security program on September 11, 1970.60 This program laid
the foundation for increased airport screening and government
control of this screening.
Between the announcement of the program in 1970 and
1973, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) developed various rules requiring airports to develop security and screening
Id. at 56.
See, e.g., Sisk, supra note 28, at 1307–08.
56 Harawa, supra note 2, at 8.
57 Id. at 3–4.
58 Id. at 8–9 (discussing the first American plane hijacking committed in 1961
by an armed passenger who boarded a flight to Key West with plans to divert the
plane to Cuba by force).
59 Id. at 8.
60 Id. at 9 (noting that September 11, 1970, would “become an ominous date
in American aviation history”).
54
55
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programs, culminating in a 1972 rule requiring mandatory, routine searches of “all carry-on items and magnometer screening
of all airline passengers by January 5, 1973.”61 These searches
were to be “conducted by airline personnel, but in the presence
of armed law enforcement officers.”62 From the 1970s onward, aviation regulatory control was firmly in the hands of the U.S. government, but security action still fell to various other entities,
mostly airport operators.63
The next major shift in regulatory control over the airways
followed the terrorist attacks of 9/11.64 On November 19, 2001,
President George W. Bush signed the ATSA to increase air travel
security and safety.65 The ATSA established the TSA, which was
“designed to prevent similar attacks in the future.”66 The TSA
was initially created within the Department of Transportation
but was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security in
2003.67
The ATSA was a strong step to prioritize security and safety in
American airways and largely revitalize the public’s confidence
in air travel.68 Today, the TSA still carries out the broad mission,
under its vision statement: “An agile security agency, embodied
by a professional workforce, that engages its partners and the
American people to outmatch a dynamic threat.”69 The agency
boasts it is positioned as a “counterterrorism organization.”70
Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
63 Cf. id. at 10 (maintaining airports to develop and execute search and screening measures carried out by “airline personnel”).
64 Id. at 11–12.
65 Id. at 12; Lauren Pugh, Note, We’re Soarin’, Flyin’: The Third Circuit Holds
Travelers May Sue Transportation Security Officers in Pellegrino v. United States
Transportation Security Administration, Division of Department of Homeland
Security, 64 VILL. L. REV. 629, 633–34, 634 n.30 (2019).
66 Mission,
TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/about/tsa-mission
[https://perma.cc/FA7M-S5GD].
67 49 U.S.C. § 114(a) (current statute amended to reflect the new location of
TSA within the Department of Homeland Security); Harawa, supra note 2, at 12
n.62.
68 Harawa, supra note 2, at 12–13.
69 TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., TSA STRATEGY 2018–2026, at 2 (2018), https://
www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/tsa_strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KYVEPDB].
70 Peter Neffenger, TSA’s 2017 Budget - A Commitment to Security (Part III),
TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN. (Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.tsa.gov/news/press/testimony/
2016/03/02/tsas-2017-budget-commitment-security-part-iii [https://perma.cc/
K5EL-4P9V].
61
62
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The TSA Administrator is “responsible for day-to-day Federal
security screening operations for passenger air transportation
and intrastate air transportation,” which includes hiring, training, and retaining “security screening personnel.”71 The ATSA
mandates that the TSA issue regulations requiring any air carrier to “refuse to transport—a passenger who does not consent
to a search” of the passenger or the passenger’s property for
unlawful possessions, including weapons and explosives.72 Such
a mandate requires the search of a passenger to be “consensual,” but a search is mandatory to travel on any air carrier.73
Thus, consent is essentially mandated.
TSA screening “incorporates unpredictable security measures,” which include inspection of checked and carry-on baggage, traditional metal detectors, millimeter wave advanced
imaging technology, and physical pat-downs.74 Due to the
agency’s goal to provide a “layered approach to security” that is
flexible, pat-downs and bag screenings occur for various reasons.75 The TSA announced that a pat-down might be required
“if the screening technology alarms, as part of unpredictable security measures, for enhanced screening, or as an alternative to
other types of screening.”76 TSOs are responsible for deciding
how to implement and carry out these “unpredictable” and flexible security measures.77 The agency promotes in its recruiting
material that TSOs can move into management positions or tactical positions located outside the security checkpoints.78
2.

A Misuse of Authority Leading to Injured Flyers

Repeatedly, headlines have carried outrageous stories of
TSOs’ failures to carry out federally mandated searches appro49 U.S.C. § 114(e).
Id. § 44902(a).
73 See id. § 44902(c).
74 See Security Screening, supra note 1.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-268, AVIATION SECURITY: TSA
HAS POLICIES THAT PROHIBIT UNLAWFUL PROFILING BUT SHOULD IMPROVE ITS
OVERSIGHT OF BEHAVIOR DETECTION ACTIVITIES (2019) (reporting number of
complaints filed with TSA and referencing autonomy of TSO to refer passengers
for additional screening).
78 See Transportation Security Officer Requirements: How to Become a TSA Officer,
SECURITYGUARD-LICENSING.ORG, https://www.securityguard-license.org/articles/
become-a-tsa-officer/ [https://perma.cc/JCE2-P3EN].
71
72
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priately and safely.79 These failures harm individual passengers,
threaten air travel security as a whole, and jeopardize the public’s confidence and respect in airport screening and security.
Over three years, the TSA received approximately 3,700 complaints related to civil rights and civil liberties,80 many recounting incidents of humiliation that every traveler dreads as they
near the security checkpoint. Multiple complaints reported uncomfortable instances of agents screening intimate areas numerous times at an unnecessarily slow pace or in another improper
manner.81 A sixty-three-year-old traveler reported that an agent
said he had to inspect his “genital area” five times.82 One traveler reported he was subject to a “routine pat-down,” where the
screener hit his testicle with such force it made the passenger
jump in pain.83 One woman was given a pat-down in the public
checkpoint four times, then “taken to a private room and told to
drop her pants for screening.”84
Some instances of questionable TSA behavior have been organized by multiple officers and have resulted in criminal
charges.85 In 2015, two TSOs were terminated for their involvement in a “scheme to grope attractive men” at the Denver airport where a male officer would signal to a female officer when
a male passenger he found attractive was in line.86 The female
officer “would falsely enter the sex of the passenger as female, so
the machine would report an anomaly” near the passenger’s
Harawa, supra note 2, at 3–4.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 77; see also Pellegrino v. U.S.
Transp. Sec. Admin., 937 F.3d 164, 180 (3d Cir. 2019) (en banc) (“In 2015, for
example, fewer than 200 people (out of over 700 million screened) filed complaints with the TSA alleging harm that would fall within the scope of the proviso.”). “In 2017, only one out of every 100,000 passengers lodged a complaint
about the ‘courtesy’ of a TSO, . . . a statistic beyond suits alleging harm that could
fit [the Proviso].” Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 180 (citation omitted).
81 Mike Beaudet, TSA Hit with Complaints of Invasive Security Checks, WCVB-TV,
https://www.wcvb.com/article/tsa-hit-with-complaints-of-invasive-securitychecks/27349885 [https://perma.cc/2FYJ-LSGJ] (May 2, 2019, 8:12 PM).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Andrew Blankstein & Phil Helsel, Two TSA Officers Fired for Scheme to Grope
Attractive Men at Denver Airport, NBC NEWS (Apr. 14, 2015, 6:44 PM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/two-tsa-officers-fired-scheme-grope-hot-mendenver-airport-n341596?cid=par-time-article_20150415 [https://perma.cc/
QSM9-RJGM] (criminal charges were not brought because “no victims have come
forward”).
86 Id.
79
80
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groin, triggering a pat-down.87 The male officer would then conduct the pat-down using the palms of his hands in violation of
TSA policy.88
In 2020, an officer at the Los Angeles International Airport
was charged with “one felony count of false imprisonment for
intentionally and unlawfully detaining an individual through the
use of fraud or deceit.”89 The officer removed a woman from the
screening line, telling her she would be required to undergo
additional screening; he then took her to an elevator where he
told her he could complete the screening there rather than in a
private screening room.90 He told her to “show her ‘full
breasts’” and “lift her pants and underwear” before telling her
“she was all done and that she had nice breasts.”91
Where individuals have filed civil litigation seeking recovery,
the most common tort claims brought include false imprisonment, negligence, and battery. Unfortunately, these claims are
not only for physical injuries from negligence but also include
the heinous invasion and disrespect of passengers’ most private
areas. One passenger was taken to a private room for a “groin
search,” where she was instructed by the TSO to “widen her
stance.”92 With another TSO present, the TSO “began the patdown by sliding her hands along the inside of [the passenger’s]
thigh and proceeded to digitally penetrate and inappropriately
fondle [the passenger].”93 Another passenger had a similarly disturbing encounter when passing through security, but the TSO
Id.
Id. The TSA states that “officers use the back of the hands for pat-downs over
sensitive areas of the body. In limited cases, additional screening . . . with the
front of the hand may be needed to determine that a threat does not exist.”
Security Screening, supra note 1 (click “Pat-Down Screening”). Officers should “advise” passengers of the pat-down to “help [passengers] anticipate any actions
before [they] feel them.” Id.
89 Press Release, State of California Dep’t of Just., Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Becerra Announces Arrest and Criminal Complaint Against Former
TSA Agent for False Imprisonment (Feb. 6, 2020), https://oag.ca.gov/news/
press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-announces-arrest-and-criminal-complaint
-against-former [https://perma.cc/N63J-KYZL].
90 Alisha Ebrahimji, A Former TSA Agent Is Accused of Forcing a Woman To Expose
Her Breasts During Airport Screening, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/08/us/
tsa-agent-arrest-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/3267-X28B] (Feb. 8, 2020,
12:52 PM).
91 Id.
92 Leuthauser v. United States, No. 2:20-CV-479 JCM, 2020 WL 4677296, at
*1–2 (D. Nev. Aug. 12, 2020).
93 Id. at *2. After the incident, Leuthauser reported the incident to the “airport police, but they advised [her] that the TSA was outside of their jurisdiction
87
88
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failed to give the passenger the option of a private room and
proceeded to assault the passenger under the guise of a screening at the checkpoint in public view.94 Heinously, the passenger
was threatened with arrest if she did not cooperate with the
officers.95
TSOs have the power to demand consenting passengers complete screening outside of conscionable or feasible means. In
one incident, the TSO removed a four-year-old’s custom leg
braces after the parents informed officers the child could not
walk without them and required the four-year-old to walk
through the metal detector unaided without his leg braces.96
The need for passenger recourse is clear. To fly, every passenger must submit to TSA screening procedures.97 Passengers
should have confidence that airport screening will be respectful,
safe, and efficient. Where it is not, injured passengers should be
able to recover from the one that mandated the screening and
controls U.S. aviation security: the federal government. No passenger should have to face the risk of injury, trauma, or assault
to reach their final destination.
III.

TURBULENCE AHEAD: TSOS UNDER THE “LAW
ENFORCEMENT PROVISO”

The question of whether a TSO is a law enforcement officer
for purposes of the Proviso is developing into a strong circuit
split.98 By the end of 2020, four circuits had issued opinions
upon the question. The Third and Eighth Circuit found that
and did not take action.” Id. Leuthauser brought suit for battery and intentional
infliction of emotional distress under the FTCA. Id.
94 Gesty v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 3d 859, 862 (D. Ariz. 2019) (dismissing
the claim because the plaintiff did not allege the TSO who assaulted her was a
designated law enforcement officer to fall under the Proviso).
95 Id.
96 Pugh, supra note 65, at 629–30 nn.4–5.
97 See 49 U.S.C. § 44902(a), (c).
98 Only the Second, Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits heard an appeal or
ruled on the issue. See Leytman v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Transp. Sec.
Admin., 804 F. App’x 78, 81 (2d Cir. 2020) (remanding the case for further fact
finding on the role of a TSO); Iverson v. United States, 973 F.3d 843, 845 (8th
Cir. 2020) (finding a TSO “satisf[ies] the FTCA’s definition of an investigative or
law enforcement officer”) (emphasis omitted); Pellegrino v. U.S. Transp. Sec.
Admin., 937 F.3d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 2019) (en banc) (finding that the “words of
the proviso dictate the result” and TSOs fall within the scope of the Proviso);
Corbett v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 568 F. App’x 690, 701 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding
TSOs do not fall under Proviso, where the court relied on the statutory authority
of the TSA Administrator to designate law enforcement officers).
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TSOs were law enforcement officers under the Proviso,99 and
the Eleventh Circuit found the opposite.100 In Leytman v. United
States, the Second Circuit remanded the case back to the district
level, finding the record as to the TSO’s job duties inadequate
to answer the question.101 This Section will expand on the current state of the law addressing TSOs within the scope of the
Proviso.
A.

TSOS FALL WITHIN

THE

LAW ENFORCEMENT PROVISO

The Third Circuit can be credited with creating a circuit split
when it diverged from the dominant interpretation that TSOs
were not law enforcement officers under the Proviso.102 Regardless, the Third Circuit’s divergent view found its roots in the Supreme Court’s most recent precedent requiring the waiver to be
interpreted without extratextual assumptions hindering the
analysis.103
In Pellegrino, Nadine Pellegrino was detained at a security
checkpoint for further screening.104 She was taken to a private
screening room where her belongings were searched and damaged in the process.105 The TSOs then required Pellegrino to
repack her bags and threw away several of Pellegrino’s belongings without telling her.106 As she was retrieving her belongings
from the private room, a TSO blocked Pellegrino as she attempted to collect one of her bags, forcing her to crawl underneath the table to reach the bag and leave the screening
room.107 Pellegrino was then detained for what the TSOs
claimed was an attempted assault.108 Based on these false allegations, Philadelphia police arrested Pellegrino and held her for
Iverson, 973 F.3d at 845; Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 168.
Corbett, 568 F. App’x at 701.
101 Leytman, 804 F. App’x at 81.
102 Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 197–98 (Krause, J., dissenting) (pointing to other
courts who only extended the scope of the Proviso to “traditional law enforcement duties”).
103 Id. at 171–72 (majority opinion) (“[T]he Supreme Court clamped down on
a cramped reading of the proviso.”) (citing Millbrook v. United States, 569 U.S.
50, 56–57 (2013)).
104 Pellegrino v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., 855 F. Supp. 2d 343, 350 (E.D. Pa.
2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 937 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 2019) (en banc)
(cited for factual background).
105 Id. at 351.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 351–52.
99

100
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eighteen hours.109 Ultimately, the TSA could not present any
video evidence or witnesses to corroborate the TSOs’ claims.110
After submitting an administrative claim to the TSA, Pellegrino
brought suit under the FTCA, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.111
The district court found that TSOs, such as those that handled the screening of Pellegrino, were not law enforcement officers under the Proviso based on the legislative history, and
therefore, the U.S. government could not be held liable for the
combative and harmful screening carried out against Pellegrino.112 Pellegrino appealed to the Third Circuit.113
On the first hearing, the Third Circuit affirmed the district
court and issued a ruling finding TSOs are not law enforcement
officers under the Proviso.114 The Third Circuit granted a rehearing, voting to rehear the case en banc.115 Being an issue of
first impression, the Third Circuit reversed its earlier ruling and
found TSA screeners to be law enforcement officers based on
the text of the Proviso.116
Since the Third Circuit’s decision, the Eighth Circuit followed
suit, finding that TSOs “satisfy the FTCA’s definition of an investigative or law enforcement officer.”117 In Iverson v. United States, Iverson, who walked with crutches, sued for injuries suffered from a
fall during a TSA pat-down.118 Iverson was required by a TSO to
“stand on his own power” without the full support of his
crutches, and “a TSO pulled him forward and then abruptly let
go, causing [him] to fall,” which resulted in injuries.119 After the
TSA denied his administrative claim, Iverson brought suit for
battery and negligence under the FTCA.120 The Eighth Circuit
considered each term of the definition, relying heavily on the
Id. at 352.
Id. at 353 (all criminal charges against Pellegrino were dropped or
dismissed).
111 Id. at 355–56 (administrative claim was denied by the TSA).
112 Pellegrino v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., 937 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2019)
(en banc).
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Pellegrino v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., 904 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 2018) (order
granting rehearing en banc).
116 Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 180–81.
117 Iverson v. United States, 973 F.3d 843, 845 (8th Cir. 2020).
118 Id. at 846.
119 Id.
120 Id.
109
110
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Pellegrino opinion.121 Specifically, the court found that TSOs are
officers “charged” by Congress through the ATSA “with the
power to conduct airport screenings.”122 The court notably rejected the government’s argument that TSOs are not officers
based on the ATSA’s designation of TSOs as officers, noting that
the ATSA’s definition of employee does not exclude officers,
nor is it a statutorily sound cross-reference, stating:
[T]he government’s argument has an unacceptable statutory effect: It uses a later enactment—the ATSA—to limit the scope of
an earlier enactment—the FTCA proviso. As it stands, the proviso, passed in 1974, covers TSOs because they satisfy the ordinary meaning of officers. If we were to import Congress’s
classification of TSOs from the ATSA, which was passed in 2001,
with the interpretation the government prefers, TSOs would not
be officers but mere employees. That would limit the [FTCA’s]
scope and alter its definition of officers. In short, this would require us to hold that Congress silently altered a term’s meaning
in one statute by passing an unrelated statute almost 30 years
later.123

When looking at the Proviso as a whole, the Eighth Circuit
found that there is “nothing in the language of the proviso to
prevent TSOs from also being included as they perform their
specialized searches to ensure public safety and national security.”124 Recognizing that the definition “contemplates traditional
law enforcement officers,” it pointed to the fact that “[t]he proviso itself expressly defines the officers whose acts can cause injuries that are actionable” and should be interpreted broadly.125
Furthermore, the court looked to the current precedent of Millbrook and Dolan to find that the Proviso should be interpreted
broadly to achieve the intended purpose.126
The Second Circuit had the opportunity to address the question but remanded the case due to an inadequate record.127 Specifically, the Second Circuit seemed to rely on the statutory
reading that TSA agents are divided into two exclusive categoId. at 847–48.
Id. at 848.
123 Id. at 849–50.
124 Id. at 853.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 854–55.
127 Leytman v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec. Transp. Sec. Admin., 804 F. App’x
78, 81 (2d Cir. 2020) (remanded for discovery regarding tortfeasor’s duties to
determine if TSOs were responsible for duties under the FTCA’s definition of
“investigative or law enforcement officers”).
121
122
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ries: “security screening personnel” and “law enforcement personnel.”128 The court vacated and remanded the case to include
“discovery focused on the roles of the TSA employees alleged to
have been involved.”129 The Second Circuit leaves the question
of how, if at all, these two identified categories of TSA agents
could affect the outcome of the case.130 This may signal that the
Second Circuit could apply a fact-specific inquiry in future decisions interpreting the Proviso.
B.

OPPOSING ARGUMENT

The Eleventh Circuit, in non-binding precedent, was the first
circuit to issue a ruling discussing the applicability of the Proviso
to TSA agents.131 In a per curiam opinion, the Eleventh Circuit
relied heavily on a distinction between “employee” and “officer”
as used in the FTCA and on the distinction between screeners
and law enforcement officers in the ATSA.132 However, the
court failed to conduct any textual analysis of the statutory language of the FTCA’s definition of law enforcement officer.133
Both Pellegrino and Iverson produced lengthy dissents opposing each court’s analysis of the issue. The dissenting arguments
relied heavily on the historical application of the Proviso.134 The
Pellegrino dissent parted with the majority’s textual breakdown of
the Proviso, arguing instead that the word should be read in
context.135 But, when proceeding to demonstrate this context,
the Pellegrino dissent argued the Proviso’s definition should be
read with the overlying understanding that it applies to criminal
law searches because the Proviso refers to the power to “execute
searches.”136 The Pellegrino dissent focused on the division beId. at 80.
Id. at 81.
130 Id. at 81. The Second Circuit declined to address the difference in TSA
agents. “Rather than address in the first instance how the differing definitions
and duties of TSA screeners and TSA law enforcement officers may affect the
resolution of this dispute, if at all, we think it best to . . . remand . . . .” Id. at 81.
131 Corbett v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 568 F. App’x 690, 701 (11th Cir. 2014).
132 Id.
133 Id. (declining to “resolve the thorny ‘search’ issue” referring to the use of
“search” in the Proviso definition).
134 Pellegrino v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., 937 F.3d 164, 181–83 (3d Cir. 2019)
(en banc) (Krause, J., dissenting); Iverson v. United States, 973 F.3d 843, 860–61
(8th Cir. 2020) (Gruender, J., dissenting).
135 Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 181.
136 Id. at 185 (dissent finds the term “execute searches” a term of art); Iverson,
973 F.3d at 860–61 (Gruender, J., dissenting) (“[S]ometimes a ‘search is not a
search’ in the relevant sense of the word”).
128
129
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tween administrative and investigative searches.137 However, this
division is not enumerated in the FTCA or the ATSA and does
not support a reading of the plain meaning of the text within
the context of the statute as a whole.
Similarly, the Iverson dissent argued that the majority misapplies a textual reading by picking and choosing definitions that
allow for their desired reading.138 However, the Iverson dissent
relied on the division between employee and officer as
presented in the ATSA, which was rejected by the majority.139
Like the Pellegrino dissent, the Iverson dissent argued that the
Proviso should be read in light of criminal law and that the
searches described in the Proviso should only be those for criminal investigative purposes.140
The Supreme Court has not granted certiorari to determine
whether a TSO is an “investigative or law enforcement officer”
within the Proviso. The circuits currently seem to be split over
how to read the Proviso’s definition and how the FTCA and
ATSA each reflect federal sovereign immunity.
IV.

CLEARED FOR LANDING: ENSURING RECOURSE
FOR PASSENGERS

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the FAA reported over 10
million scheduled passenger flights annually and 2.9 million
passengers flying daily through U.S. airports.141 The TSA was
created to provide for security and screening in our nation’s airports,142 but this mission involves mandatory screening that,
while necessary, exposes passengers to potentially invasive
screening, searches, and inspection at the hands of federal
agents. The only way to travel by air in the U.S. is to submit to
137 Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 194–97 (Krause, J., dissenting); Iverson, 973 F.3d at
860–61 (Gruender, J., dissenting).
138 Iverson, 973 F.3d at 865.
139 See id.
140 Id. at 862.
141 Air Traffic by the Numbers, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/
air_traffic/by_the_numbers/ [https://perma.cc/3SF4-DMNB] (Sept. 21, 2020,
4:32 PM) (data reported from fiscal year 2019). Even with the reduction in travel
due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the TSA was screening approximately one million passengers daily at the start of 2021. TSA Checkpoint Travel Numbers (Current
Year Versus Prior Year(s)/Same Weekday), TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/
coronavirus/passenger-throughput [https://perma.cc/HW77-GLCD].
142 Transportation Security Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://
www.dhs.gov/transportation-security-overview [https://perma.cc/92MY-3P84]
(May 24, 2021).
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this screening process to access the terminal.143 Due to the personal and mandatory nature of the searches and the potential
for abuse, a reliable path to recovery should be available against
the federal government where TSOs commit intentional torts.
To provide a clear path to recovery, Congress should amend the
ATSA to define TSOs as “investigative or law enforcement officers” for purposes of the FTCA. Alternatively, the Supreme
Court should follow the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning and find that
TSOs duties do fall within the scope of the Proviso.
A.

CONGRESS SHOULD TAKE LEGISLATIVE ACTION

The federal government should bear the liability for torts
enumerated in the Proviso because the government mandated
the security screening and provided the means to federalize aviation security.144 The Proviso is limited to an enumerated list of
intentional torts, making it a limited waiver in nature.145 The
Proviso should not be further limited by a narrow interpretation
based on extratextual notions that shield the government from
intentional torts committed by TSOs in the course of employment. To combat this suggested reading of the Proviso, the
ATSA should be amended to define TSOs as “investigative or law
enforcement officers.” This legislative amendment would align
the terminology used in the FTCA to allow for a clear scope of
the waiver of sovereign immunity under the Proviso, creating a
consistent law for the courts to apply. This amendment removes
the judicial inquiry and interpretation that courts currently
must undergo when applying the Proviso. Such an amendment
would also create a clear statutory path to recovery that provides
no avenue for expansion to other types of federally mandated
searches.
Several courts have theorized that the FTCA definition of “law
enforcement officers” was intended to limit recovery only to
those scenarios that have been historically seen as exploited by
extreme force and abuse of law enforcement authority.146 It is
argued that this scope is appropriate because traditional law enforcement officers are trained in Fourth Amendment requirements, and therefore, an intentional tort would be a violation
See 49 U.S.C. § 44902 (requiring air carriers to refuse to transport passengers who do not consent to a search).
144 Harawa, supra note 2, at 12–13.
145 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
146 See, e.g., Pellegrino v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., 937 F.3d 164, 194–95 (3d
Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Krause, J., dissenting).
143
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that the government should and could be liable for.147 However,
this theory does not play out when applied to TSA screening
and the division of responsibilities. TSOs are placed in a position to invade passengers’ person and property to comply with
the mandated security measures daily. If these TSOs are not
“trained” on the same constitutional requirements as law enforcement officers, they should not be conducting similarly invasive searches. Yet, that is what the statute mandates.148 Because
the ATSA mandates screening, TSOs should be defined statutorily as investigative or law enforcement officers within the
originating statute. This designation could be limited to define
TSOs as officers only under the FTCA’s definition.
In a similar argument, it has been argued that the Proviso
should only apply to “traditional” law enforcement functions
and that the type of “consensual” screening conducted by the
TSA is not a traditional law enforcement function.149 Law enforcement functions provided for in the ATSA are not isolated
to those designated “law enforcement officers.” The TSA Administrator can utilize personnel to execute law enforcement
functions through multiple avenues. First, the TSA Administrator “may designate an employee . . . as a law enforcement officer.”150 Second, the TSA Administrator can grant authorization
for “an individual who carries out air transportation security duties” to carry a firearm and make arrests.151 Third, the TSA Administrator may allow local airport operators to use federal
personnel to “supplement State, local, and private law enforcement personnel.”152 Where law enforcement officers are not
solely responsible for these functions, the FTCA should not be
narrowly read only to provide recourse based on title rather
than function.
By amending the ATSA, recourse and litigation for injured
passengers is not only simpler but fits within the statutory construction of the entire ATSA. The ATSA provides the TSA Ad147 See, e.g., Iverson v. United States, 973 F.3d 843, 858 (8th Cir. 2020)
(Gruender, J., dissenting).
148 See 49 U.S.C. § 114(e)(4) (“The Administrator shall . . . be responsible for
hiring and training personnel to provide security screening at all airports . . . .”).
The TSA Administrator is tasked with issuing safety regulations to “[p]rotect[ ]
against violence and piracy,” which includes “requir[ing] a uniform procedure
for searching and detaining passengers and property . . . .” Id. § 44903(b), (3).
149 See supra Section III.B.
150 49 U.S.C. § 114(p)(1).
151 Id. § 44903(d) (with approval of Attorney General and Secretary of State).
152 Id. § 44903(c).
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ministrator with the authority to delegate necessary police
power and law enforcement functions through multiple avenues
and is not limited to law enforcement officers in name. The statute even defines agency personnel authorized to conduct traditional law enforcement functions as “law enforcement
personnel,” not employees, while granting them similar functions as enumerated in the FTCA definition.153 Additionally,
other individuals in the agency can be authorized to carry a firearm and make arrests without a warrant for airport security
purposes.154
To clarify the delegated authority granted by Congress to the
TSA Administrator, Congress should amend the ATSA to provide that TSOs are “investigative or law enforcement personnel”
for purposes of the FTCA.
B.

THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RESOLVE

THE

CIRCUIT SPLIT

Four circuits have considered whether a TSO is an “investigative or law enforcement officer.”155 This developing circuit split
leads to muddled precedent for lower courts and uncertainty for
future litigants. To create consistent and clear precedent, the
Supreme Court should apply sound principles of statutory construction and adopt the conclusion of the Third and Eighth Circuits, following the plain meaning analysis of the Eighth Circuit.
To find TSOs are officers under the Proviso, the Court should
first look to the “ordinary public meaning”156 of the Proviso as a
whole, while rejecting extratextual inferences and analysis.
Next, the Court should consider the statutory scheme of the
TSO’s origin statute in light of Millbrook. This correct interpretation provides recourse without expanding the Proviso to any
federal employee conducting routine inspections.

153 See id. § 44903(a)(2) (“The term ‘law enforcement personnel’ means individuals—(A) authorized to carry and use firearms; (B) vested with the degree of
the police power of arrest the Administrator considers necessary . . . and (C)
identifiable by appropriate indicia of authority.”).
154 Id. § 44903(d) (“[T]he Administrator may authorize an individual who carries out air transportation security duties—(1) to carry firearms; and (2) to make
arrests without warrant for an offense . . . committed in the presence of the individual or for a felony . . . .”).
155 See supra Section III.
156 Iverson v. United States, 973 F.3d 843, 854 (8th Cir. 2020).
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The Plain Meaning of the Proviso Includes TSOs

The Proviso only waives sovereign immunity for six intentional torts that are committed by an “act[ ] or omission[ ] of
investigative or law enforcement officers.”157 The Proviso states
that: “[f]or the purpose of this subsection, ‘investigative or law
enforcement officer’ means any officer of the United States who
is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to
make arrests for violations of Federal law.”158
The dissenting opinions in Pellegrino and Iverson accused the
majority of finding individual definitions to fit their reading.
The Supreme Court should look to the majority’s reasoning in
Iverson to find an interpretation true to statutory construction
and FTCA precedent. The Eighth Circuit first looked to the “ordinary meaning”159 of the terms of the Proviso to consider the
parties’ arguments, but the court ultimately found that “when
interpreting the statute, we consider ‘the whole statutory
text.’”160
In considering if a TSO is “any officer of the United States,”
the court made several important points about the authority of a
TSO.161 First, “Congress, by statute, charged TSOs with the
power to conduct airport screenings.”162 Second, the “TSA holds
them out to the public as officers . . . to ensure the public respects them.”163 Recognizing TSOs’ authority is also consistent
with the federalization of aviation security beginning in the
1970s.164 The federal government expanded its control from
mandated regulation to controlling and executing the screening
with the TSA.165 This expansion delegated authority to conduct
all airport screening to the TSA, its Administrator, and TSOs.166
“Congress thus mandated that TSOs carry out screenings and
authorized physical searches as one means to complete that
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
Id.
159 Iverson, 973 F.3d at 847 (quoting Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942
(2000)).
160 Id. at 847–48 (quoting Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006));
see also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
161 Iverson, 973 F.3d at 848.
162 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44901).
163 Id.
164 See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
165 See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text (discussing the transformation from the anti-piracy regulations instituted by President Nixon and the ATSA
signed by President George W. Bush).
166 See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
157
158
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duty. The statute specifically authorizes federal employees,
TSOs, to screen passengers and property.”167 When considering
the term to “execute searches,” the court did not distinguish between prevention of federal violations and active violations.168
The TSOs are conducting searches to remove items that are not
allowed on flights, including weapons, explosives, and liquids
and gels.169 TSO searches are not merely to prevent violation of
federal regulation but to prevent the transportation of items
that violate federal law and threaten the safety of other passengers. The Supreme Court should follow the reasoning of the
Eighth Circuit and interpret the Proviso as a whole without allowing the later statute to alter the plain meaning of the
FTCA.170
The dissenting opinions in Pellegrino and Iverson argued that
the Proviso should be read only to apply to traditional law enforcement functions or “traditional police functions.”171 This argument is flawed. Both the Pellegrino and Iverson dissents argued
that the respective majority erred by reaching outside the context but then proceeded to reach outside the text and overlay
the Proviso with police functions and criminal law connotations
that are not present in the text of the Proviso.172 The scope of
the Proviso determines liability, and liability provides relief to
injured passengers. Congress has statutorily mandated for airport security through screening of every passenger and every
bag.173 The Proviso does waive liability for functions that are typically conducted by police officers in criminal investigations, but
it does not limit the waiver exclusively to these functions only
when carried out by police officers. Where the government created the power and duty to conduct searches, the government
should be liable where it has waived immunity. Liability should
Iverson, 973 F.3d at 851.
Contra id. at 864 (Gruender, J., dissenting).
169 See id. at 848 (majority opinion); id. at 864 (Gruender, J., dissenting). Further, the Iverson majority refused to apply the canon noscitur a sociis because the
term “[s]earches is neither an obscure word nor is its meaning doubtful” and the
“list is joined by the disjunctive ‘or.’ . . . . Therefore, . . . the terms in the list need
not modify each other.” Id. at 853 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
170 See supra notes 121–124 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 139–140 and accompanying text.
172 See Iverson, 973 F.3d at 863–64 (Gruender, J., dissenting); Pellegrino v. U.S.
Transp. Sec. Admin., 937 F.3d 164, 199–200 (3d Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Krause, J.,
dissenting).
173 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 114(e)(4), 44903(b)(3).
167
168
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flow to where the power is delegated. The power cannot flow to
where the liability flows.
In a similar argument, the Pellegrino and Iverson dissents argued the Proviso cannot provide for liability because its language is ambiguous, and following established precedent, any
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the sovereign.174 However, on its face, the Proviso is not ambiguous. The dissenting
opinions found ambiguity only because their interpretation assumes that the Proviso applies to traditional police powers or
traditional law enforcement functions. Just as this interpretation
was flawed by reaching beyond the context of the FTCA, the
Proviso is not ambiguous where extratextual assumptions give
rise to the ambiguity. Congress did not include language in the
Proviso that limits the scope to police powers or criminal law,
and the Court should not limit liability where Congress did not.
The Supreme Court should follow the guidance outlined in
Dolan and Millbrook.175 In this instance, narrowly interpreting the
Proviso to find it only applies to criminal law enforcement officers or only to investigative searches is an “unduly generous
interpretation[ ] of the exception[ ].”176 Narrowly interpreting
the Proviso based on the extratextual notion that it only applies
to criminal law enforcement harms the “calibration” of recourse
that Congress has provided by the passage of the Proviso.177 Just
as Millbrook limited the interpretation to the text of the Proviso,
the interpretation here should be limited to the plain meaning
of the text. It is of note that Congress chose not to include
“criminal” as a modifier to “investigative or law enforcement officer,” and by this absence, the Proviso should not be constrained by this extratextual modifier.
2.

The ATSA Statutory Scheme Does Not Limit Law Enforcement
Functions

The statutory scheme of the ATSA, read as a whole, does not
designate the law enforcement functions enumerated in the
Proviso exclusively to appointed “law enforcement officers.” The
dissenting opinion in Pellegrino argued that the text of the ATSA
174 Iverson, 973 F.3d at 867 (Gruender, J., dissenting); Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at
199–200 (Krause, J., dissenting).
175 See supra text accompanying notes 38–54.
176 See Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 492 (2006) (citing Kosak v.
United States, 465 U.S. 848, 853 n.9 (1984)).
177 Wang, supra note 6, at 1960–64.
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is a major reason to bar liability under the Proviso.178 This line
of reasoning is a reasonable interpretation of section 114(p) of
the ATSA in isolation, but it is not a complete reading of the
statute and should be rejected by the Supreme Court.179
The ATSA mandates the TSA Administrator establish screening operations for air transportation, including “hiring and
training personnel to provide security screening at all airports in
the United States where screening is required.”180 The statute
outlines the “[l]aw enforcement powers”181 of the TSA Administrator and specifies that the Administrator has power to “designate an employee of the [TSA] or other Federal agency to serve
as a law enforcement officer,”182 who has the authority to carry a
firearm, to make arrests without a warrant for limited situations,
and to execute warrants.183
In section 44903 of the ATSA, the term “law enforcement personnel” is defined in relation to air transportation security requirements.184 As a part of these requirements, an airport
operator is required to “establish an air transportation security
program that provides a law enforcement presence and capability at each of those airports that is adequate to ensure the safety
of passengers” to include the use of “services of qualified State,
local, and private law enforcement personnel.”185 Where the
TSA Administrator finds these services are inadequate for airport security, “the Administrator may authorize the operator to
use, on a reimbursable basis, personnel employed by the Administrator . . . to supplement State, local, and private law enforcement personnel.”186
Both terms, law enforcement personnel and law enforcement
officer, independently fit within the FTCA’s definition of “law
enforcement officer.”187 The ATSA does not limit the enumerated law enforcement functions, such as carrying a firearm and
Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 190–92 (Krause, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 122–124 and accompanying text (where the Eighth Circuit
held the later enacted statute (the ATSA) should not change the plain meaning
of the former statute (the FTCA)).
180 49 U.S.C. § 114(e)(4).
181 Id. § 114(p).
182 Id. § 114(p)(1).
183 Id. § 114(p)(2).
184 Id. § 44903(a)(2).
185 Id. § 44903(c)(1).
186 Id.
187 See supra Section IV.A (discussing the TSA Administrator’s various ways to
delegate law enforcement functions under the ATSA).
178
179

2021]

IMMUNITY DOESN’T FLY

493

executing arrests, solely to individuals designated as law enforcement officers.188 Instead, the TSA Administrator has the authority to designate law enforcement personnel with traditional law
enforcement duties and the authority to supplement state, local,
and private security personnel with agency personnel (as well as
with personnel from other agencies, with certain approvals).189
The ATSA allows for the specific designation of law enforcement officers within the TSA, but the statute does not confine
traditional law enforcement functions (specifically those listed
within the Proviso’s definition) to TSA Administrator-designated
law enforcement officers. Reading the statute as a whole supports the conclusion that the ATSA does not distinguish between officer and employee solely based on exclusive, nonmutual law enforcement functions. Therefore, when applying
the Proviso, the Court should look to the “status of persons
whose conduct may be actionable.”190
As discussed by the Eighth Circuit, the use of “employee” to
describe TSA screening agents should not per se remove TSOs
from the scope of the Proviso.191 This, again, overlays extratextual understanding of the FTCA by allowing “a later enactment—the ATSA—to limit the scope of an earlier enactment—
the FTCA proviso.”192 This argument also only considers the
term “officer” in isolation from the context of the Proviso as a
whole. As the Court found in Dolan, Congress was capable of
including broad exceptions193 and specific exceptions.194 Just as
the Court recognized a specific exception in the postal excep188 See supra Section IV.A (discussing how the TSA Administrator may allow
agency personnel to supplement airport transportation screening programs); see
49 U.S.C. § 44903(d) (“[T]he Administrator may authorize an individual who
carries out air transportation security duties—(1) to carry firearms; and (2) to make
arrests without warrant . . . .”) (emphasis added).
189 See 49 U.S.C. § 44903(c).
190 Millbrook v. United States, 569 U.S. 50, 56 (2013).
191 See Iverson v. United States, 973 F.3d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 2020) (“We decline
the invitation to disregard the FTCA’s ordinary meaning and instead import Congress’s classification of TSOs as employees from the ATSA . . . Congress described
TSOs as employees in the ATSA, but it also defined employees in ATSA to include
officers.”).
192 Id.
193 Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 489–90 (2006). The Court highlights other broad exceptions in the FTCA. For example, as the Dolan Court
noted, other FTCA exceptions include “[a]ny claim for damages caused by the
fiscal operations of the Treasury . . . .,” “[a]ny claim arising out of combatant
activities of the military . . . during time of war,” and “[a]ny claim arising from the
activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority.” Id. The Dolan Court emphasized
Congress’s use of the term any in each of these exceptions.
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tion at issue in Dolan, the Court should view the Proviso as a
specific exception to the definition of “investigative or law enforcement officer.” The judiciary should not limit this provided
remedy by importing definitions from later statutes. As the
Third Circuit stated: “Congress has created a remedy; we are
simply giving effect to the plain meaning of its words.”195 The
Court should give effect to that remedy for all injured
passengers.
3.

Correctly Recognizing TSOs Under the Proviso Does Not Unduly
Expand the Scope

Correctly finding TSOs to fall within the Proviso will not expose the federal government to liability beyond the scope intended by Congress. The TSO’s role is security focused. Holding
the government liable protects passengers from the same type of
harms Congress intended through the Proviso.
The TSA is tasked with the “day-to-day Federal security screening operations”196 and the duty “to protect passengers and property . . . against an act of criminal violence or aircraft piracy.”197
Because of this focus, correctly finding TSOs to be law enforcement officers under the Proviso will not open the floodgates of
litigation for any intentional tort committed by a federal employee executing any type of inspection.198
The federal government mandated screening to be provided
by the TSA.199 This includes “regulations requiring [any] air carrier . . . to refuse to transport—a passenger who does not consent to a search . . . or property of a passenger who does not
consent to a search of the property . . . .”200 “[TSOs] conduct
security screening of passengers, baggage and cargo at airports
to prevent any deadly or dangerous objects from being transported onto an aircraft.”201 The TSA Administrator has the authority to delegate traditional law enforcement functions, such
194 Dolan, 546 U.S. at 490 (where “Congress expressed the intent to immunize
only a subset of postal wrongdoing, not all torts committed in the course of mail
delivery” fall in the postal exception).
195 Pellegrino v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., 937 F.3d 164, 180 (3rd Cir. 2019)
(en banc).
196 49 U.S.C. § 114(e)(1).
197 Id. § 44903(b).
198 Contra Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 196 (Krause, J., dissenting).
199 See supra Section II.B.1.
200 49 U.S.C. § 44902(a).
201 Transportation Security Officer, TSATESTPREP.INFO, https://tsatestprep.info/
tso-desc [https://perma.cc/EU3V-XTY9].
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as carrying firearms and making arrests, to deputized personnel
and any agency personnel.202 This cross-section of invasive
searches that are mandatory to board an aircraft and delegation
of security functions distinguishes searches conducted by TSOs.
Furthermore, the title TSO was instituted to align better the
nomenclature and public perception with the statutory job duties. In 2005, the TSA officially dubbed security screeners
TSOs.203 Though nomenclature should not be dispositive to federal torts law, this change points to the need to provide TSOs
with a title that fits their responsibilities and allows them to use
their training to pursue other security-focused positions.204
Where the government mandates security protocols and completely controls the regulation, it should not be able to hide behind sovereign immunity where sovereign immunity is waived
for the category of harm caused. The government should be liable for torts committed by TSOs conducting screening mandated by the ATSA. The Proviso was passed to provide recourse
for torts committed by federal agents out of concern for injuries
stemming from force and abuse of power.205
The Supreme Court should follow the reasoning laid out by
the Eighth Circuit, finding TSOs are investigative or law enforcement officers within the Proviso, when read as a whole. This interpretation avoids allowing extratextual factors to change
Congress’s intended waiver and preserves the limited nature of
the Proviso, all while ensuring appropriate liability where the
federal government mandated aviation security operations.
V.

CONCLUSION

Only two circuits recognize federal liability for intentional
torts, including assault, misrepresentation, and false arrest, committed by TSOs responsible for screening the millions of passengers who travel through U.S. airports annually. Even where
these searches are consensual, passengers have very little control
because TSOs have the authority and discretion to conduct the
See supra notes 153–154 and accompanying text.
Pugh, supra note 65, at 630 n.5.
204 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-299, AVIATION SECURITY:
TSA’S STAFFING ALLOCATION MODEL IS USEFUL FOR ALLOCATING STAFF AMONG AIRPORTS, BUT ITS ASSUMPTIONS SHOULD BE SYSTEMATICALLY REASSESSED 56 (2007).
The renaming of screeners to TSOs also allowed TSA to assist TSOs in pursuing
upward career progression, including DHS law enforcement positions. Id.
205 See, e.g., Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam).
202
203
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search. TSOs are officers empowered by law, through the ATSA,
to conduct mandatory screening. Law enforcement functions
are not limited to designated law enforcement officers under
the ATSA. In order to provide a clear path for federal liability,
the ATSA should be amended to designate TSOs as an “investigative or law enforcement officer” for purposes of FTCA liability. Absent legislative action, the Supreme Court can, and
should, rely on the plain meaning of the Proviso and hold that
TSOs fall within the scope of the Proviso. Airport security is of
utmost importance, but that security cannot come at the price
of passengers’ peace of mind, safety, and recourse.

